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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #04333-86/1
17 September 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: Frederick L. Wetters *FLW*
National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

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A Warning and Forecast meeting on Sub-Saharan Africa was held on 16 September 1986. The attached report has not been coordinated with meeting participants but is being circulated to them. If they believe their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you.

Frederick L. Wetters
Frederick L. Wetters

Attachment:
NIC #04333-86

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WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

NIO/AF advised the group that he had been contacted by Major General Philip Russell, Commander, US Army Medical Research and Development Command, Ft. Detrick, on the subject of AIDS in Africa. General Russell, whose office is funding research on the matter in Zambia, advised that data was accumulating suggesting that AIDS was assuming plague proportions and in a worse case scenario, for example, the entire Zambian army could be dead in five years. NIO/AF announced [redacted] he would convene a special Community meeting to discuss the problem and consider the merits of an IIM on the subject. NIO/AF suggested that analysts check their European histories to read about the 15th Century syphilis plague to obtain a useful frame of reference.

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The first area of discussion was to review the prospects of 11 African leaders that reporting suggests were facing threats to their political survival. CIA/DI/ALA led the discussion and addressed the NIO/AF's key question of would these leaders survive until 1 January 1987.

NIGER: The group agreed with CIA that President Kountche faced no serious threat from the military at this time. Grumbling in the enlisted ranks was becoming audible over declining quality of life, failure to resolve economic problems, and corruption, but there seemed no resonance among senior officers. Kountche has a tough, loyal bodyguard detachment and he watches the military closely, transferring officers whose loyalty is suspect to remote areas. Possible Libyan threats, aside from any assassination attempt, do not appear to pose a credible short-term threat to Kountche. Kountche is failing to address serious structural economic problems, and we receive periodic unconfirmed reports of his health problems, but there was consensus on the call that Kountche would remain in power on 1 January.

GUINEA BISSAU: President Vieira probably had Soviet Bloc help in uncovering the "plot" which led to the arrest and execution of his lieutenant, Paulo Correia, this year. Vieira has backed away somewhat from his opening to the West, promoted pro-Soviet types in the Cabinet, and seems to retain the loyalty of the two top troop commanders. The 350 Soviet and 150 Cuban military advisers certainly watch the military closely. The Soviets are probably watching Vieira's economic reform program and are unlikely to encourage his removal in the short term. Vieira faces one serious problem in that the majority Balante tribe saw the late Correia as its leader and may be disaffected. The collective judgment was that Vieira would remain in power through 1 January.

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LIBERIA: The political opposition to President Doe has become moribund, and the most dynamic potential opposition group--the United Peoples' Party led by Baccus Matthews--has stated that it will continue to pursue accommodation with Doe through 31 December. Doe faces profound and massive economic problems, including a local currency suffering rapid devaluation, late pay, hard currency shortages, and other economic problems. The likelihood of strikes and an opposition renaissance portend that Doe's survivability in 1987 is questionable and he will face serious challenges, but these will not coalesce by 1 January. It was our consensus call that he will survive in office at that date.

Warning Note: Although Doe will hold on until 1987, he faces the prospect of serious challenges in 1987.

CONGO: President Sassou-Nguesso, thanks to IMF and French government loans, has bought some time and his Chairmanship of the OAU probably provides some insurance against Soviet support to intrigues against him from the hard-line pro-Soviet faction. He faces the impact of declining oil revenues, resistance to IMF austerity, north-south tribal problems, and opposition from the left and these problems will mount in 1987. Our consensus call was that he would survive in office through 1 January.

BURKINA FASO: President Sankara has effectively quashed all opposition, both real and imagined, and seems to have consolidated his power. His key army lieutenants still seem loyal to him, and he watches the pro-Communist left closely. Libyan support in the form of arms arranged by Sankara helps satisfy army officers and gives Sankara an external protector and ally. Our judgment was that Sankara will survive in office through 1 January.

SIERRA LEONE: There was consensus that President Momoh has demonstrated few leadership skills and does not have a firm grip on his government. He has alienated much of the powerful "establishment," and his recent association with an Israeli firm and hints of recognizing Israel will cause problems both with Sierra Leone Muslims (50% of the population) and with Lebanese merchant leader Jamil Mohamed, who is the economic czar of the country and who has immense political clout. The economy remains in a shambles but Momoh has managed to sustain rice subsidies to the military and politicians. There were nuanced differences within the Community on whether he would survive until 1 January--NIO/AF felt that it was very chancy, while DIA thought that Momoh had bought a little time. All agreed that Momoh faced serious challenges and faced a real possibility of ouster by an army coup in early 1987.

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Warning Note: Of the African leaders examined, Momoh faces the most imminent prospect of serious intrigues and attempts at his ouster, almost certainly within the next six months.

NIGERIA: President Babangida has moved quickly to scotch coup plotting and officer discontent and has carefully staffed key units in Lagos with loyal officers. While his approach to Nigeria's pressing economic problems is cautious to the point of creating serious new economic tensions and a declining quality of life for Nigerians, he avoids creating issues around which serious opposition could coalesce. There is no evidence of credible coup plotting and his firm treatment of student and trade union demonstrators has intimidated potential civilian opponents for now. He will survive in office through 1 January.

COMOROS: President Abdullah seems oblivious to the growing opposition to his feudal style personal rule. French and mercenary support will probably keep him in office for a while, but if he continues to alienate the Comorian elite, the French may decide to support a quick putsch and remove him. Little is known about plotting from leftist, pro-Communist emigres in France--we presume the French are keeping a watch on it. The consensus was that Abdullah would survive through 1 January, but the French could pull the plug on him at any time and will probably give increasing consideration to his replacement in 1987.

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SEYCHELLES: The latest dismissals of senior army officers show that President Rene still acts quickly where he perceives a threat. This move will probably in the short term please junior officers, since those dismissed were incompetent and corrupt. The dispatch of a Soviet warship to Victoria probably intimidates potential opponents by showing Rene has a big-power friend. The economic problems Rene faces are serious but are unlikely to cause grave problems immediately. Racial tensions (Rene is white, the army is black) will probably increase but for the short term Rene will make it through 1 January.

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SUDAN: Prime Minister Sadiq will probably survive, although we cannot rule out one of the many groups beginning to plot will make some sort of unsuccessful attempt to seize power. Plots develop slowly in the Sudan, and in our assessment disillusionment with Sadiq has not percolated down to the

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urban masses or rank-and-file military. Sadiq faces immense economic and political problems and has made little serious effort to address them. His ability to garner new weapons for the military, to keep adequate food supplies in Khartoum, and the ability of the army to avoid a military fiasco in combating southern insurgents serve as key indicators of his short-term survivability. Libyan plotting seems somewhat feckless--there does not seem to be a serious pro-Libyan military faction capable of a successful coup--but we cannot rule out some attempted putsch. Unless the army blunders into a real disaster in the south, we see Sadiq surviving through 1 January, although his prospects in 1987 are not bright.

Warning Note: We cannot rule out some form of attempted putsch by pro-Libyan military plotters or even other groups, although we rate the prospects for any such attempt as low. Coup plotting will become much more threatening in 1987 as the negative effects of Sadiq's military and economic policies become more manifest.

MILITARY UPDATES: DIA provided updates on three areas of military activity:

Angola: [redacted] cumulative evidence points to some form of renewed government offensives from Lucusse and Cuito Cuanavale. [redacted]

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[redacted] FAPLA force levels at those two places are not yet sufficient for a major push, however. Any offensive launched now will probably carry into the start of the rainy season, which will inhibit air cover and movement. While the evidence is not clear, our best collective call envisions a slow plodding offensive with limited objectives and uncertain prospects. Untimely rains around Cuito may presage an early onset of the rainy season, which would severely limit any offensive.

Mozambique: DIA argued that if RENAMO's dry season successes are continued and improved into the rainy season in November they could generate coup plotting against Machel from his own military and place the Machel regime under great stress. NIO/AF argued that RENAMO had to renew operations around Maputo and interdict roads and rail around Maputo to create 1984-level regime-shaking stress, and RENAMO ability to accomplish this remains to be seen. All agreed that a fresh injection of Zimbabwean troops could temporarily slow RENAMO down as it did last year. The consensus was that our recent Mozambique Estimate was on target and that RENAMO's military prospects were promising of new successes.

Sudan: The southern insurgent SPLA has the upper hand and its siege warfare of government garrisons is creating major problems for SPAF (Sudan armed forces). SPAF may well attempt a dry season offensive and at minimum attempt to open supply lines to major government-held towns. Its success was not guaranteed.

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Chad: The prospect of factional fighting among the Libyan-backed GUNT in northern Chad around the Libyan-occupied town of Fada would offer a massive temptation for Habre to send some forces into any such engagement. Habre has over 4,000 mobile and reasonably well-armed forces at Kalait in a position to move on Fada quickly. Habre would probably not commit major numbers of this detachment, though.

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SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

The following components were represented at the Sub-Saharan Africa warning meeting:

EXTERNAL:

Office of the Vice President
DIA/Defense Intelligence Officer
DIA/DE-4
DIA/JSI-5B
DIA/DB-8D
Army/OACSI
Army/AIAIT-AF
Air Force
State/INR
NSA

INTERNAL:

DDI/ALA/AF
DDI/CRES
DDI/FBIS
DDI/LDA
DDI/NESA
DDI/NPIC
DDO/AF
ICS/OHC
O/NIO/Warning

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